depression), but that the paranoid patient attempts to compensate for them in a unique way, leading to ideas of persecution.
Critics of this model of paranoia have argued that paranoid patients often have low self-esteem (Garety & Freeman, 1999) , and that this is inconsistent with the idea that their attributions are self-protective. In fact, research on self-esteem in paranoid patients has yielded inconsistent results, some studies reporting a high self-esteem (Candido & Romney, 1990; Lyon, Kaney, & Bentall, 1994) or high consistency between selfrepresentations and ideals (Havner & Izard, 1962; Kinderman & Bentall, 1996) in paranoid patients, and others reporting low self-esteem in deluded patients in general (Bowins & Shugar, 1998) and in paranoid patients in particular (Freeman et al., 1998) . It is possible that the external attributions made by paranoid patients often fail to compensate for their underlying feelings of low self-worth, in which case normal or high self-esteem would be expected in some patients but not others (Bentall, Corcoran, Howard, Blackwood, & Kinderman, 2001) . A hypothesis that is compatible with this account has been proposed by Trower and Chadwick (1995) , who have argued on the basis of phenomenological data that there are two types of paranoia: one in which self-esteem is low and in which persecution is held to be deserved, and one in which self-esteem is relatively high and persecution is seen as undeserved.
Clearer evidence is available for the proposition that paranoid patients have dysfunctional schemas for evaluating self-worth. Fear, Sharp, and Healy (1996) reported that paranoid patients scored highly on the Dysfunctional Attitude Scale, a nding that was replicated by Bentall and Kaney (1996) in both currently depressed and currently non-depressed paranoid patients. Beck (1983) has argued that dysfunctional schemas can be divided into two main types, which he has described as sociotopy (the tendency to evaluate self-worth in terms of love and approval by others) and autonomy (the tendency to evaluate self-worth in terms of achievements and ability to control one's destiny). In a study of the relationship between self-schemas and personality disorders, Ouimette, Klein, Anderson, and Riso (1994) measured both types of schemas using Robins et al.'s (1994) Personal Style Inventory (PSI) and reported that paranoid personality traits were speci cally associated with autonomy scores after depression had been controlled for.
These ndings led to several important questions. First, it would be useful to know whether the dysfunctional schemas observed in paranoid patients are state-like and closely associated with orid paranoid symptoms, or trait-like, in which case they might be a source of vulnerability to paranoid thinking. Second, it would be useful to know whether paranoia, or a disposition to paranoia, is associated with any particular kind of dysfunctional schema. Given the ndings reported by Ouimette et al. (1994) and that orid paranoia is associated with a dismissive-avoidant attachment style (Dozier & Lee, 1995; Dozier, Stevenson, Lee, & Velligan, 1991) and strong feelings of mistrust, it seems likely that autonomy schemas will be dominant during acute illness. However, on the premise that anxieties about the beliefs and attitudes of others towards the self confer vulnerability to paranoia, remitted patients might be expected to have high scores for sociotropy.
A second aim of the study was to explore the relationship between paranoid symptoms and intolerance of ambiguity and uncertainty. Colbert and Peters (2002) recently reported that delusional ideation in normal individuals is associated with selfreports of a high need for disclosure, which has been de ned by Kruglanski (1989) as 'the desire for a de nite answer on some topic, any answer compared to confusion and ambiguity' (p. 14). Interestingly, Need for Closure scores were not associated with performance on an experimental measure of 'jumping to conclusions' on which deluded patients had previously been shown to perform abnormally (Garety, Hemsley, & Wessely, 1991; Huq, Garety, & Hemsley, 1988) . Need for closure has yet to be studied in clinical groups. However, apparent evidence of intolerance of uncertainty and ambiguity in deluded patients was obtained in an investigation reported by Roberts (1991) , in which a group of patients were asked if they would welcome disproof of their delusional beliefs. The majority said that they would not, leading Roberts to conclude that the patients' delusional worlds were often preferable to real life because they were more predictable. In this study, self-reported need for closure was measured in acutely ill and remitted paranoid patients for the rst time.
Method

Participants
The clinical sample comprised 57 participants with a diagnosis of schizophrenia and one with a diagnosis of delusional disorder according to DSM-IV criteria (American Psychiatric Association, 1994). All were either suffering from persecutory delusions at the time of testing or had previously experienced persecutory delusions as indicated by case note data. Forty-three were receiving inpatient treatment, and 14 were under the care of a psychiatrist as outpatients; all were in receipt of neuroleptic medication. Current symptomatology was assessed using the Positive and Negative Syndromes Scale (PANSS; Kay, Opler, & Fiszbein, 1986) , IQwas assessed using the National Adult Reading Test (NART; Nelson, 1982) and concurrent depressive symptomatology was assessed using the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI; Beck & Beamesderfer, 1974) .
Thirty-three of these participants, 23 men and 10 women with a mean age of 34.47 years (SD 11.17), ful lled the symptom criteria for inclusion in the acute group, which was a total score of 9 or more on the PANSS delusions and suspiciousness scales (each scale minimum 1, maximum 7), and their estimated mean full-scale IQ was 109.48 (SD 9.35). One of these participants did not complete the BDI, and the mean score of the remaining 32 was 20.25 (SD 13.33). The criterion for inclusion in the remitted group, which consisted of 14 men and 10 women with a mean age of 36.75 years (SD 9.86), was a total score of 3 or less on the PANSS delusions and suspiciousness scales. The mean IQ for this group was 110.97 (SD 9.45). The mean BDI score for all but one remitted participant who failed to complete this assessment was 16.00 (SD 10.96) .
A convenience sample of 57 non-psychiatric control participants consisted of 35 men and 22 women with a mean age of 33.04 years (SD 11.07), a mean IQ of 116.90 (SD 5.80) . One of these participants did not complete the BDI, and the mean score of remaining 56 was 7.41 (SD 5.44 ). This group was recruited via the University of Liverpool subject panel.
There were no signi cant differences among the three groups for age. Despite attempts to recruit controls with a wide range of backgrounds, there was a signi cant difference between the groups for IQ scores, F 2, 111 11.10; p < .0001. Post-hoc Boneferroni tests revealed that both the acute patients ( p < .001) and the remitted patients ( p < .01) scored less than the controls. This difference was controlled for by including IQ as a covariate in all of the main statistical analyses.
Consistent with our previous ndings, a signi cant difference was also found for BDI scores, F 2, 108 20.08, p < .001, accounted for by the control participants scoring less than both the remitted ( p < .001) and acute ( p < .001) participants. Because of the considerable theoretical signi cance of any covariation between paranoid ideation and depression (Zigler & Glick, 1988) , and because self-schema scores are typically elevated in depressed patients (Gotlib & Hammen, 1992; Williams, 1992) we conducted our main analyses both excluding and including depression as a covariate.
Materials
The Personality Style Inventory (PSI; Robins et al., 1994) , a 48-item self-schema measure, which was developed as a result of dissatisfaction with previously existing self-schema measures, was completed by all participants. It has six subscales, which can be added to obtain composite scores of autonomy and sociotropy. The three sociotropy subscales are concerns about what others think (7 statements, e.g. ''I am easily persuaded by others'') dependency (7 statements, e.g. ''It is hard for me to break off a relationship even if it is making me unhappy'') and pleasing others (10 statements, e.g. ''I often put other people's needs before my own''). The three autonomy subscales are perfectionism/self-criticism (4 statements, e.g. ''It bothers me when I feel that I am only average and ordinary''); need for control (8 statements, e.g. ''I am easily bothered by other people making demands of me'') and defensive separation (12 statements, e.g. ''I tend to keep other people at a distance''). Items are scored using 6-point Likert scales ranging from strongly agree to strongly disagree. Subscales are considered to have good factor structure, internal consistencies and temporal stabilities (Robins et al., 1994) . The Need For Closure Scale (NFCS; Kruglanski, Webster, & Klem, 1993) , a 42-item scale designed to assess the epistemic need for closure, was completed by all but one acute and one control participant. In its original form, items are scored along 6-point Likert scales but, after piloting, these were simpli ed to true/false for ease of completion by psychiatric patients. A total need for closure score is the total positive score for all 42 items (maximum score 42). In addition to the total score, the scale is divided into ve facets that represent ''heterogeneous potential sources of the need for closure'' (Kruglanski et al., 1993) . These are: need for order and structure (10 items); affective discomfort as a consequence of levels of ambiguity (8 items); decisiveness of the individual's choices (7 items); ability to cope with unpredictability (9 items); and closemindedness (8 items). The NFCS has satisfactory reliability and test-retest reliability over 12 weeks (Kruglanski et al., 1993) . Because of persisting debate about the merits of calculating total or facet scores (Neuberg, Judice, & West, 1997) both methods were used in this study.
Results
PSI data
Mean scores on the six PSI subscales and the composite sociotropy and autonomy scales are shown in Table 1 . It can be seen that the highest autonomy scores were obtained from the acute patients and the highest sociotropy scores from the remitted patients. A MANOVAperformed on these data, with groups as a between-subjects factor, composite scores as dependent variables, and IQ as a covariate, revealed a signi cant group effect, Wilks's F 4, 216 4.60, p < .001, with no signi cant effects for IQ. When univariate tests were carried out, the apparent group difference for sociotropy did not reach signi cance, F 2, 109 2.33, p .10, but that there was a signi cant effect for autonomy, F 2, 109 5.98, p < .005, which was accounted for by the higher scores of the acute patients compared with the controls ( p < .005). When these analyses were repeated with BDI scores as an additional covariate, the effect of depression on sociotropy was signi cant, F 1, 105 16.82, p < .001, and the group main effect just failed to reach signi cance, F 2, 105 2.94, p .06. The effect of depression on autonomy was also highly signi cant, F 1, 105 27.18, p < .001, and group differences in autonomy disappeared entirely when this was taken into account, F 2, 105
.27, p .81.
Similar results were obtained with the six subscale scores. A MANOVA revealed a signi cant effect for group, Wilks's F 12, 208 3.30, p < .001, again without a signi cant effect for IQ. Univariate tests revealed signi cant differences between the groups for concern about what others think, F 2, 109 5.27, p < .01; perfectionism/ self-criticism, F 2, 109 3.26, p < .01; and need for control, F 2, 109 6.88, p < .01; and a marginally signi cant effect for defensive separation, F 2, 109 3.04, p .05. Bonferroni tests revealed that the remitted patients scored signi cantly higher than the controls on concern about what others think ( p < .005), whereas the acute patients scored higher than the controls on need for control ( p < .001) and defensive separation ( p < .05). When the univariate tests were repeated including BDI scores in the covariate list, signi cant associations were found between depression and all of the PSI subscales ( p at least < .05) and the only signi cant group effect that remained was for need to please others, F 2, 105 3.16, p < .05, which was accounted for by the marginally signi cant higher scores of the remitted patients compared with the controls (Bonferroni p .05) .
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NFCS data
Total and subscale scores on the NFCS are also shown in Table 1 . A one-way ANOVA on the total scores revealed a statistically signi cant effect for group, F 2, 108 14.83; p < .0001, with a modest effect for IQ, F 1, 108 4.02, p < .05. The group difference was accounted for by both the acute patients ( p < .001) and the remitted patients ( p < .001) scoring higher than the control participants. No difference was observed between the acute and remitted groups. When depression was added to the covariate list, it had no signi cant effect, F 1, 104 0.37, p .85, and the group effect remained highly signi cant, F 2, 104 9.74, p < .0001, still accounted for by differences between the acute and control participants ( p < .001), and between the remitted and control participants ( p < .001).
These conclusions were broadly supported by analysis of the ve NFCS facets. A signi cant group difference was observed when these scores were analysed by MANOVA, Wilks's F 10, 208 3.18; p < .0001; in this analysis the effect for IQ did not approach signi cance. Univariate analyses revealed that both clinical groups measured higher than the normal controls, but not signi cantly different from each other on need for order ( p at least < .05), affective discomfort in the face of ambiguity ( p at least < .001), dif culty coping with uncertainty ( p at least < .02), and close-mindedness ( p at least < .05). When these analyses were repeated with BDI scores as an additional covariate, signi cant effects of depression were found for affective discomfort as a consequence of ambiguity, decisiveness, and coping with uncertainty ( p at least < .01). However, signi cant group differences remained for need for order, F 2, 104 5.27, p < .01, affective discomfort, F 2, 104 3.99, p < .05, decisiveness, F 2, 104 4.94, p < .01, and close-mindedness, F 2, 104 3.40, p < .05. Bonferroni tests con rmed that both clinical groups scored higher than the normal controls on need for order ( p at least < .05), the acute patients scored higher than the controls on decisiveness ( p < .01) and the remitted patients scored higher than the controls on affective discomfort as a consequence of ambiguity ( p < .05).
Discussion
Our initial analyses of the schema data provided some support for our prediction that acute paranoid psychosis would be associated with high scores for autonomy, but only marginal support for our additional prediction that remitted patients would score high on sociotropy. (In the case of the latter data, nonsigni cant trends in the expected direction were found for most analyses, although the group difference on the speci c sociotropy scale, concern for what others think, was statistically signi cant.) However, the effect of including BDI scores as a covariate complicated this picture. The observed association between autonomy and depression was so great that the group differences in autonomy were abolished when this was taken into account. Despite a similar effect of BDI scores on sociotropy, group differences on this variable were less affected, and marginal evidence of high sociotropy in the remitted group remained when depression was taken into account. Nonetheless, overall, the present ndings were contrary to expectation and do not obviously support the hypothesis that self-schemas play a critical role in paranoid ideation, as proposed by ourselves (Bentall et al., 2001) and others (Garety et al., 2001) .
Given the substantial evidence of abnormal schemas in depressed patients (Gotlib & Hammen, 1992; Williams, 1992) , the observed associations between depression and the schema measures are unsurprising. However, the present ndings are inconsistent with our previous observation of high DAS scores in nondepressed paranoid patients (Bentall & Kaney, 1996) and with Ouimette et al.'s (1994) nding that high autonomy scores in people with paranoid personality traits could not be explained by comorbid depression. As Ouimette et al. used the same measure as that used in the present study, the method of assessment is unlikely to be responsible for these discrepancies. One possible interpretation is that dysfunctional self-schemas in currently ill and remitted paranoid patients become more activated when they are depressed, a nding that has been reported in the depression literature (Segal & Ingram, 1994 ). This effect might be expected in people who are vulnerable to or actually experiencing paranoia if, as supposed by Zigler and Glick (1988) , paranoia is a form of camou aged depression. The obvious alternative possibility is that dysfunctional self-schemas do not have the causal role in paranoid thinking that we have supposed, and that previous reports of an association between schema measures and paranoia re ect self-doubt, discomfort, and a search for meaning as a consequence of feeling persecuted. Further studies, perhaps using longitudinal designs or moodinduction procedures with remitted patients, will be required to disentangle these hypotheses.
The need for closure data is more easily interpreted. Paranoid patients reported a high subjective need for order, affective discomfort in the face of ambiguity, dif culty coping with uncertainty, and a high level of close-mindedness. These ndings were obtained not only from the acutely ill patients, but also from the remitted patients, and could not be accounted for by depressive symptoms. These characteristics accord well with clinical experience, are consistent with Roberts' (1991) observation that deluded patients often prefer the certainty of their delusional worlds, and concur with Colbert and Peters' (2002) observation of a high need for closure in a nonclinical sample of individuals scoring highly on a measure of delusional ideation. The high scores in the remitted patients assessed in the current study, and also in Colbert and Peters' (2002) nonclinical sample, suggest that need for closure may be associated with vulnerability to delusions rather than active delusional ideation. However, although the covariance analysis suggests that these scores cannot be attributed to comorbid depression, further studies with other clinical groups are required to establish whether this characteristic is speci cally associated with delusions or present in people who are vulnerable to other kinds of dif culties.
The most important limitation of the present study is that we used a simpli ed response format for the Need for Closure Scale. However, given the magnitude of the group differences observed, it is dif cult to see how this simpli ed format could have undermined our conclusions. Against this limitation, the strengths of the study were that we included remitted patients and systematically explored associations between the observed group differences and comorbid depression. These methodological re nements, have been absent in most research on the psychology of delusions.
As psychological interventions for delusions often address schema issues (Fowler, Garety, & Kuipers, 1995) the main clinical implications of the present ndings concern the need for closure data. The present ndings suggest that directly addressing patients' emotional reactions to uncertainty may be of some clinical utility. It is conceivable that current cognitive behavioural techniques could be modi ed to better address this issue with psychotic patients.
